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Law v. Wilson.

     "This was an action for goods sold and delivered to the defendant, as a member of the provisional committee of the Southampton, Petersfield, and London Direct Railway Company. The sum sought to be recovered was 58l. 17s. 6d.

     "It appeared that, in the month of September last, a scheme was got up by Mr. Duncan, the solicitor, to construct a railway from Southampton to Petersfield, and then on 'direct' to London. On the 30th of that month, Mr Duncan and the other solicitors wrote the following letter to the defendant :—

     "In reply to this letter the writers obtained no written answer; but in a few days after it had been sent, although the party to whom it had been addressed had removed from his former habitation, the defendant called at the office and stated that he should have no objection to become a director of the company. The clerk thereupon endorsed on the letter 'agreeable to be a director.' The company went on, and presently an allotment of 50 shares was awarded to the defendant as one of the provisional committee. The defendant, however, not only never took up the shares, but never took any notice either of the numerous letters and official reports and papers which were constantly being forwarded to him from the company's office. By-and-by the railway market became under the influence of the panic, and then the managing committee—for there was a managing committee, consisting of some 16 or 18 persons—thought it useless to proceed with the undertaking, and at once turned their minds to the consideration of the question as to which would be the best way of winding up the concern, and liquidating the debts which had been incurred. The result of this deliberation was a resolution to return 25s. per share, out of the 2l. 2s. deposit, to the shareholders, which was subsequently done, and that each provisional committeeman should be called upon to contribute the sum of 35l. as his fair proportion of the expenses incurred. Accordingly a letter, containing the resolution, and soliciting the payment of the 35l., was sent to the defendant, but of that communication he took not the slightest notice. In the end, however, the present action was brought by the plaintiff, one of the creditors of the concern, against him, in his character of a member of the provisional committee of the company.

     "On behalf of the plaintiffs case, there was under these circumstances, a failure in proving that the defendant had, upon any occasion, acted in the conduct or management of the affairs of the company.

     "Mr. Hoggins, for the defendant, said he should throw himself back upon the question which had been left to the jury in Barnett v. Lambert, namely, 'did the defendant render himself liable for the goods supplied in consequence of his having given an express consent or an implied consent by personal communication or in writing' to become a provisional committeeman, and to become, in common with others, responsible and liable for the debts of the company?—or did he give such an authority to the secretary of the company as could bind him to the consequences of any acts of what now appeared to be a select managing committee? That was the simple question, he apprehended. It was quite clear that he had not given any consent to become a member of the provisional committee, and, therefore, that being so, it was beyond all doubt that he was in no way liable for the debts.

...

    "The jury returned a verdict for the defendant.