BOROUGH REGISTRATION COURT.
(Before C. S. Whitmore, Esq., Revising Barrister.)
The Court for revising the Lists of Voters for the Borough of Reading was held in the Council Chamber, on Monday last. The amount of business looked heavy, there being 242 claims and objections in the three parishes. We say "looked" heavy, because, owing to the bungling of the "liberal" agents, their entire list of objections was rejected by the Revising Barrister.
Mr. F. M. Slocombe appeared for the Conservatives, and Mr. G. Huggett, Secretary of the Westminster Association, assisted Mr. Cowderoy, appeared for the liberals.
After some preliminary business had been disposed of, it was determined to proceed with the lists of objections. The first objection was one by the "liberal" party against "Arnold Gooding."
Mr. Slocombe said that before the case was gone into, he had a preliminary objection to offer, and his objection was that in the notice of objection the form used by the objector and sent to the overseers was not that prescribed by the Act. The 17th section enacted—
"That every person whose name shall have been inserted in any List of Voters for any city or borough may object to any other person as not having been entitled on the last day of July next preceding, to have his name inserted in any List of Voters, for the same city or borough; and every person so objecting shall, on or before the 25th of August in that year, give or cause to be given, a notice according to the form numbered (10) in schedule (B.) or to the like effect, to the overseers who shall have made out the list in which the person so objected to shall have been inserted. * * * And every person so objecting shall also give or cause to be left at the place of the abode of the person objected, as stated in the said list, a notice according to the form (11) &c., and every notice of objection shall be signed by the person objecting."
Mr. Slocombe contended that the objector was thus compelled to make out his notice in the form prescribed, and that it was an acknowledged principle of law that a notice would not take effect where any matter of substance was omitted —where in fact the evidence did not appear within the four corners of the document. It was laid down by Sergeant Merewether in the Petersfield case, that it was obviously necessary the form should be strictly followed, that the party objected to might see that the objector had a legal title to object. The present Attorney-General had also stated that no notice could be "to the like effect" where the place of abode had been omitted. His (Mr. Slocombe's) objection to the notice was one of title—it was only a person on the list of voters who had any right to give objections, and the schedule required the objector to state on which list his name, appeared to give him that title to object. He was bound to show that title on the face of his notice, and he had not done so here, as would be found on reading the notice, it was signed "James Gibson," but he had wholly omitted to state what list it was that gave him the title to object.
Some discussion arose as to the parallelism of the case quoted in Elliott to this.
Mr. Huggett contended that the form in the schedule need not be followed literally, as the act states it may be "of the like effect." He also referred to the 101st clause, which enacts that
"no misnomer or inaccurate description of any person, place, or thing, named or described in any schedule, or in any list or Register of Voters, or in any notice required by this act, shall in any wise prevent or abridge the operation of this act with respect to such person, place, or thing, provided that such person, place, or thing shall be so denominated, &c., as to be commonly understood."
Now, he submitted that it would be "commonly understood" that James Gibson was on the list of voters for the parish of St. Lawrence, his name being signed to the objection as residing in Thorn-street in that parish.
The Barrister observed that in the Bristol case quoted both notices were bad. Here there was one notice properly signed.
Mr. Slocombe, in reply, said that by the Registration Act the objector was bound to satisfy both the overseers and the voter that he had a title to object. He contended (without wishing to throw out any hint to overseers) that they might feel justified, looking at what was required by the act, in leaving out from the list of objections every person thus objected to. And what great inconvenience would arise from such a party not complying with the requirements of the law? The overseers might act as he had said, or, reversing the case, the voter might receive such a notice, and throw it aside as waste paper. The Bristol case which had been quoted went further than this case; it was this—that there a party had put his name to a wrong list, but here it was to no list at all. The objector, seeking to deprive a party of his right, is bound to do all that the law requires of him before he can proceed with his objection. In the Manchester case, just decided, where the description of the objector's residence, "Portland-street," was not completely correct, Mr. Matthews laid the law down as he had just stated it, and the objections failed. Nor was the notice signed James Gibson'' one to the like effect, for the person objected to was entitled to see the objector's title on the face of the notice, and not to seek beyond its four corners for some evidence in aid. The real fact was, that the party who made these objections had made the mistake of copying the form of county notice of objection instead of the borough one, and by comparing them it would be seen that they had inserted more than was required by the borough form, and then signed the place of abode, omitting the words "on the list of voters for the parish of ——." The Legislature had evidently provided a different form for boroughs, and if the difference were immaterial they would not have enacted it. He confidently relied that the objection was a substantive one, and must prevail.
The Barrister, referring to sec. 40 of the Act, said that the objector was bound to give the notices required, and this was not a mis-description, but an omission.
Mr. Huggett said the overseers had not so judged, they had published the list of objections. He again referred to sec. 101 as remedying any misnomer.
The Revising Barrister said he thought this case was a distinct one, and rested on its own grounds. He thought the objector had not complied with the form in the schedule as required by the act. The party was not bound to consider this as a legal notice, nor were the overseers bound to publish it. They had no power to cure the imperfection of the notice by publishing it. He intimated that if the question were carried before the Court of Review, and his decision reversed it might create the inconvenience of leaving the whole number of persons objected to (some of them having no legal right) on the list of voters, as the superior Court could not go into the list of objections seriatim.
Mr. Slocombe said he would take the chance of the appeal. He had foreseen the contingency and had put in claims for several persons on the list.
NOTE.—The Bristol case, to which so much reference was made, is that of Tudball and Burges, being an appeal from the Revising Barristers' decision to the Court of Common Pleas. Tudball had objected to one Jenkins being retained in the list of freemen of Bristol, and had signed his notice "William Tudball, of Hotwell-road, on the list of voters for the parish ofClifton." His name was not on either householders' or freeholders' list for that parish, but it was upon the alphabetical list of freemen of Bristol, under the letter "T," with several others, "all of the parish of Clifton." The objection was that Tudball ought to have described himself as "on the list of freemen of the city of Bristol," and the barrister having decided that the notice was bad, an appeal was tried before the Court of Pleas. Lord Chief Justice Tindal confirmed the decision of the barrister on the ground that this was a case of misdescription, that the objector had followed the form (11) more closely than necessary; that such information was calculated to mislead and throw difficulties in the way of the party objected to.
The Court then proceeded with the other business of the registration. ...