To the Reformers of Devon—The Franchise system

TO THE REFORMERS OF DEVON.
Letter 3.

Gentlemen, —It has been said that the knowledge of a disease is half its cure. Even in political matters, before an evil can be eradicated its cause must be known. The source of a common nuisance must be ascertained before an effectual remedy can be safely applied. Now, it is alleged that our representative system is disordered. Notwithstanding the number of political mechanics that were employed about it and the amount of skill and integrity which some of them were supposed to have brought to the labour—only a few years ago—the system is said to be again deranged, and its timbers shaky. Some censors assert that what was, not very long ago, paraded before the country as a great measure, labelled ‟The second Magna Carta,” and the imposing attribute of finality ascribed to it—turns out to be only the old worn out system, tinkered up with more selfish cunning than honest skill. But, however this may be, the dissatisfaction with it is so general—and the murmurings at the evils which it occasions so loud—that the Great Repairer of such Machinery has pledged himself to attempt its re-adjustment in the next session of parliament. The knowledge, the talents, the inclination, and the indomitable courage of the undertaker, are undoubted—he will put the system in working order if any one can do it—but you, and the Reformers of England, must lend him your zealous assistance. To perform the task effectually is an Herculean labour, and will require your watchful co-operation.

What then are the prominent defects of our representative system? What are its principal evils? What parts are rotten to such a degree that they must be removed, and how may the remaining portions be so modified and strengthened as to be put in a proper state for efficient action? To answer these queries satisfactorily, it is perhaps necessary to examine the ground work upon which the representative system of boroughs as well as counties rests. Take the boroughs first. Lord John Russell has told us that the framers of the Reform Bill commenced by disfranchising fifty boroughs, and partially disfranchising fifty more. In looking through the list of boroughs, it is not easy for a novice in such matters to see any reason why some of them were consigned to schedule A, and others suffered to retain the power of sending members to parliament. For example, Okehampton contained 318 houses in 1831; Petersfield, 272; the first was put in schedule A, the second in schedule B. Milburn Port contained 383 houses, Reigate only 256; the latter was allowed to send a member to the House of Commons, the former was disfranchised.

Again, the Assessed Taxes for Appleby were 476; for Westbury 272; and for Malmsbury 346; the first borough was disfranchised, the other two allowed to send one member each. But notwithstanding this apparent anomaly, the list of boroughs was made out on a principle which consisted in allowing equal weight in the estimation of the relative importance of a borough to the number of houses which it contained, and the amount of assessed taxes which it paid. The method adopted for carrying this principle into effect was thus explained by the late Lieut. Drummond, in a letter to Viscount Melbourne—[Hansard vol. 9, 3rd series.]

1st.—Take the average number of houses contained in the boroughs, to be arranged; divide the number of houses in each borough by this average number, and a series of numbers will be obtained, denoting the relative importance of the different boroughs with respect to houses.

2nd.—Take the average amount of the assessed taxes paid by the same boroughs and proceed precisely in the same manner described with respect to the houses; a series of numbers will result, showing the relative importance of the different boroughs with regard to the assessed taxes.

3rd.—Add together the numbers in these two lists, which relate to the same boroughs, and a series of numbers will be produced, denoting the relative importance of the different boroughs, with respect to houses and assessed taxes combined.

Lieutenant Drummond was a highly talented and most valuable public officer,—he was an accomplished mathematician, and most happy in the application of his varied knowledge to political affairs; the above rules are founded upon very intricate formulae, the result of an elaborate analysis.

No one can more highly appreciate mathematical knowledge than I do. There is scarcely any other knowledge that admits of such palpable certainty. I should consider myself guilty of a species of treason, were I to speak one word in its disparagement. I would willingly and heartily encourage its application to every variety of subject that can reasonably be submitted to such treatment. Still, I must allow, that some limits should be put to its use. I admire the lamented Drummond’s talent and skill in his investigations, which led him to the above rules; but I must admit that in such matters, considered broadly and as they really stand, there is nothing so fallacious as facts, except figures. It would be no easy task to maintain that the application of rules so founded to the depriving or conferring of the power of sending members to Parliament, on bodies of men, was not that sort of hair-splitting which, however plausible and ingenious, must occasion anomalies, and inflict apparent, if not absolute, injustice. It made distinctions without differences. For instance, the lowest number obtained by the above rules, to which was attached sufficient weight to retain the power of sending a member to the House of Commons, was 1593—Petersfield—which was only 9 above Amersham, that had 1584, and was put in Schedule A. Now viewing the subject fairly and constitutionally, the conferring the power of returning a member upon one of these boroughs, and denying it to the other, is very like gross partiality to the one, and as gross injustice to the other, and, taking this view of the question, the same remarks apply to the whole of the boroughs, affected by the rules. Except the places which had the power of returning independent members, but the whereabouts of which could hardly be found, there was not that difference between the boroughs disfranchised and the boroughs put in Schedule B, as to justify the power conferred on the latter.

A legendary problem states that a vessel, having equal number of Christians and Turks on board, was overtaken by a terrific storm—that the captain informed the passengers that it was impossible to save the ship unless one-half of them were thrown overboard. The story says, the captain made an arrangement for making the fatal selection, which was apparently fair and equitable, but it was so contrived that eventually all the Christians were saved. The rules above given were an ingenious device—somewhat similar— and well contrived to save the half-condemned boroughs. But, the disfranchised boroughs and the drowning Turks had good cause to complain of the application of the stratagem. However, when the borough system was thus reconstructed—when the power of sending members to the House of Commons was determined with such mathematical exactnes—of course that power was made to depend upon some fixed, definite principle. Surely there was some common relation with regard to weight and importance, which runs through the whole series of boroughs—new, repaired, and old—a kind of political equity that makes the reason manifest—why, if borough B. sends members to parliament, that borough C. should have the same privilege. In a word, that the power of electing our tax imposers is fairly divided amongst the body of electors—and that a mere handful of voters have no longer, unjustly and absurdly, just the same power as the most numerous and important constituencies—that the few hundred voters of pocket borough have ceased to have as much influence in the House of Commons as the Northern Division of Yorkshire, Manchester, or Liverpool. Are then the numbers and wealth of the different constituencies which now send an equal number of members—the same? Are they in any manner equalized? Is there any common ratio, either of property or number of people or of both combined, that pervades our representative system? At this time, does each member in the House of Commons represent anything like the same number of people, or the same amount of taxable property—or both conjointly? Lastly, is the power to send members to parliament equally distributed amongst the small part of the people invested with the elective franchise—or is the whole system, at this moment, a congeries of inequalities and anomalies? I trust you are prepared to give Lord John Russell your opinion upon these inquiries—you shall, if you like, see mine next week.

MENTOR.

The GLIO Site

To the Reformers of Devon—The Franchise system